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We consider the optimal education policies of a small economy whose government has a 
limited budget. Initially, the economy is closed and the government chooses its education 
policy to maximize welfare under autarky. Then the economy trades with the rest of the 
world. Lastly, the government chooses a new education policy that maximizes welfare under 
trade. Is it ever optimal for the government to choose its new policy so that it reverses the 
economy’s comparative advantage? We find that if the budget stays fixed when it is optimal 
to ‘move up the skills chain’ it is not feasible. In such a case a foreign loan is welfare 
improving. A move in the opposite direction can be optimal and when it is optimal it is also 
feasible. 
JEL Code: F11, O15. 
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During the second half of the past century, many, at the time, develop-
ing countries that have traditionally been inward looking, opened their
economies and began to trade with the rest of the world. Initially these
economies specialized in low-skill goods and most of them still do so. But
some countries (e.g. countries in the East Asian region) have managed to
transform their economies by shifting resources to high-skill sectors and thus
reversing their patterns of trade. Their exports are now dominated by goods
whose production requires the use of high-skill labor. These economies that
have successfully achieved this transformation had to devote resources to
education in order to equip workers with the new skills that were necessary
for employment in the new sectors. This is re￿ ected by the steadily increas-
ing ￿ ow of young persons to higher education. The same type of policies
are adapted by many governments that aim to achieve similar trade pattern
reversals. Good examples are India and China where there is plenty of evi-
dence that their governments actively pursue to help produces to ￿ move up
the value chain￿ .12
Intuitively, these policies cannot be globally optimal. As long as there
is a demand for low-skill intensive goods there always be some countries
with a comparative advantage in their production. For developing countries
with limited government budgets that constrain their choices, understanding
where their comparative advantage lies is important. The following two
￿gures show the export patterns and education attainment levels of four
countries that have followed four distinct development paths over the last
three decades.
Figure 1 depicts the percentage of high-tech exports in total manufac-
turing exports over the period 1980-2000 for Argentina, Korea, Poland and
United States.3 Not surprisingly, we ￿nd that over the whole period the
exports of United States are dominated by high-tech products. In contrast,
1This is clear from the World Economic Forum￿ s reports on the China Business Summit
2003 and on the India Economic Summit 2004 and from daily business magazines and
newspapers in these two countries.
2￿ Moving up the chain￿has a dual meaning. In some cases it is taken to mean ascending
a quality ladder where the products are still the same however their quality is increasing.
In our context it implies a move along the production possibilities frontier such that high-
skill intensive goods substitute for low-skill intensive goods.
3The data on exports were obtained from the World Trade and Production Database.
For the separation of sectors into high-tech and low-tech ones we used the OECD classi-
￿cation of sectors according to their level of skills employed. We have experimented with
di⁄erent threshold levels but with no consequence for our comparisons.
2Argentina￿ s exports over the whole period are dominated by relatively low-
tech products. The other two countries are examples of economies that have
seen a change in their patterns of trade. For Korea we observe a steady in-
crease in the proportion of high-tech products exports as a percentage of
total exports that highlights the transformation of the economy during its
high-growth period. Lastly, for Poland we observe the reverse pattern. Be-
fore the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequently COMECON (the
East-European Common market) Poland￿ s exports were dominated by rel-
atively high-tech products with main destination the former Soviet Union.
These sectors proved to be non-competitive after the collapse and Poland￿ s






































































Figure 1: Patterns of Trade
Figure 2 shows the educational attainment levels for the same four coun-
3tries over the same period.4 More speci￿cally, it shows the proportion of the
population aged over 25 with post-secondary education. We observe that
the countries with the highest post-secondary education attainment levels
are those with exports dominated by high-tech products. In particular, we
notice that while in the beginning of the 1980s Korea￿s attainment level
was close to that of Argentina￿ s and Poland￿ s by the end of the 1990s it had




































































Figure 2: Educational Attainment
Our aim in this paper is to provide a theoretical understanding of the
conditions under which it is optimal for governments to encourage shifts in
production that will eventually lead to a reversal in their patterns of trade.
A number of recent papers, (Ishikawa, 1996; Grossman and Maggi, 2002;
Grossman, 2004; Bougheas and Riezman, 2007) examine the relationship
between an exogenous distribution of human capital endowments and the
patterns of trade. In this paper, we make the distribution of human capital
4The data comes from Barro and Lee (2001).
4endogenous.
In our model the role of the government is crucial. It has an indirect in-
￿ uence on production patterns through its education policy that determines
the distribution of skills in the economy. Traditionally, in trade models deci-
sions on human capital accumulation are taken by agents according to their
level of ability.5 In our model all agents are identical and the distribution of
skills in the economy is entirely determined by the government￿ s education
policy. Our choice for modeling human capital accumulation is motivated
by the fact that we think this is more relevant for developing nations. For
these nations the means available for individual investment in human capital
are quite limited for the majority of the population. Hence, the allocation
of a limited government budget is a far more important determinant of the
overall distribution of educational opportunity (and human capital) than
individual decisions. Hence, we focus on government policy as the main
determinant of the distribution of human capital.6
Our economy consists of two sectors, a low-skill sector that produces a
primary commodity and a high-tech sector that employs high-skill workers.
The productivity of each worker depends on both her sector of employment
and her level of education. Both product and labor markets are competi-
tive. Initially, we consider the closed economy case and derive the optimal
education policy that maximizes aggregate welfare under autarky. Next, we
allow the economy to trade keeping the skill distribution in the economy the
same. Finally, we allow the government to adjust its education policy and
we derive the new patterns of trade.78
We ￿nd that depending on the terms of trade, a move up the skills chain
5The relationship between human capital accumulation and trade was ￿rst considered
by Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) within the H-O framework. For some more recent
work, see Cartiglia (1997), Ranjan (2001) and Long, Riezman and Soubeyran (2007).
What limits human capital accumulation in these papers is private wealth constraints.
In contrast, Deardo⁄ (1997) and Janeba (2000) examine the e⁄ects of public policy on
human capital accumulation and the distribution of income but not on trade patterns..
6Our model implies that the distribution of wealth in the economy entirely depends on
government policy and not on personal characteristics. It is only to keep things simple
that we have not introduced any heterogeneity among agents by specifying a distribution
of ability. Had we done so governemrnt policies would still detrmine the distribution of
education attainment but in that case e¢ ciency would require that the level of education
attainment for each agent depends on his level of ability.
7In a recent paper, Egger, Egger, Falkinger and Grossmann (2005) follow a similar
procedure to consider how individual educational choice is a⁄ected by the integration of
capital markets.
8Our focus is on long-term trends and thus we have ignored any short-term adjustment
costs. For some potential pitfalls of our approach, see Davidson and Matusz (2002, 2004).
5can be optimal. However, when this is the case the budget does not allow
any change in education policy. We then consider the case in which a foreign
loan is available and ￿nd that the country can bene￿t from a foreign loan as
the welfare gains resulted from relaxing the government budget constraint
exceed the welfare losses due to the lump-sum taxation imposed in order
to repay the loan.9 We also ￿nd that reversals in the opposite direction,
moving down the skills chain, can also be optimal and that such reversals
are not budget restrained.
In the following section we take a preliminary look at the data, in section
3 we build our theoretical model, in section 4 we derive the results for the
autarky case and in section 5 we open the economy to international trade
and in the last section we o⁄er some ￿nal comments.
2 A Preliminary Look at the Data
In the following ￿ve tables we present data on educational attainment and
sectoral exports for a sample of 24 countries for the years 1980, 1990 and
2000.10 For educational attainment we show the proportion of the popu-
lation aged above 25 with secondary education and the corresponding pro-
portion for those with tertiary education. The export data indicate the
percentage of exports that are high tech goods. We have used two thresh-
olds to separate high-tech from low-tech sectors. The Broad de￿nition of
high-tech goods sectors uses a lower threshold and hence delivers uniformly
higher numbers than the Narrow de￿nition.
Table 1a includes countries which, like the United States, have been
exporting a large proportion of high-tech products throughout the sample
period.11 These countries also show very high educational attainment levels
9The theoretical literature on dynamic comparative advantage suggests that if the ini-
tial gains of trade are su¢ ciently high and thus relax the factors constraining growth (in
our case the limited budget constraint) then a reversal of exports from low-skill goods to
high-skill goods might become optimal. This suggests that economies that move up the
chain must be economies that grow fast.In this paper we focus on distributional aspects
of government policy and, for analytical tractability, we abstract from dynamic consid-
erations. For theoretical work on dynamic comparative advantage see Bond, Trask and
Wang (2003), Redding (1999) and Ventura (1997).
10The sources of the data are the same as those used for ￿gures 1 and 2. The sample
comprises of countries for which all data were available. The only exceptions are Bulgaria
and Romania for which export data for 1980 are not available but were included given
that their particular group is small.
11It is convenient to use the broad de￿nition in our ananlysis where a proportion above
￿fty percent is interpreted as the country having a comparative advantage in high-tech
6and furthermore, these levels are increasing strongly over time.
[Please insert Table 1a about here]
Table 1b includes countries like Argentina that have primarily been ex-
porting low-tech goods. Table 1b countries educational attainment levels
have been low relative to the countries in Table 1a throughout the period.
Comparing the ratio of high-tech exports to total exports (using the Broad
de￿nition) for the two groups we observe a striking di⁄erence. All the ratios
are less than 50% for the second group while nearly all ratios are above 50%
for the ￿rst one.12 We also notice that overall the ￿rst group has higher
educational attainment levels although the di⁄erences here are less striking.
Comparing tables 1a and 1b there appears to be some correlation between
educational attainment and being an exporter of high tech goods.
[Please insert Table 1b about here]
Table 1c comprises of a group of South-East Asian economies that have
achieved a remarkable transformation of their economies over the last three
decades. They have moved up the chain. It is clear from Table 1c that
one factor that played a crucial role for their success was an emphasis on
human capital accumulation as indicated by their educational attainment
rates. Looking at their patterns of trade trends we observe (using the Broad
de￿nition) that in the early 1980s most of these countries (the only exception
here is Singapore) exported primarily low tech goods. By 2000 this turned
around and essentially for all of these countries exports of high tech goods
comprised more than 50% of all exports. It is also worth noting that all these
countries, through their period of transformation, have achieved a very high
rate of economic growth. As we will see later, this might play an important
role in explaining how they moved up the chain of comparative advantage
and became exporters of high tech goods.
[Please insert Table 1c about here]
Table 1d presents data from Eastern European countries for which a
fast process of trade liberalization, as a result of the collapse of the So-
viet Union, and thus COMECON, rendered many old industrialized sectors
non-competitive and induced them to search for new exporting opportuni-
ties. The change in political geography, for example, the establishment of
goods.
12The only exception is Italy with 1980 and 1990 ratios of 48.8% and 49.3%, respectively.
7many new nations throughout the period of interest, restricts considerably
our sample size. Nevertheless, one of the implications of the collapse of
the Eastern alliance is a move down the chain of comparative advantage.
This is clear for Romania and Poland and probably for Bulgaria as indi-
cated by the narrow de￿nition. Hungary, whose exporting sectors have been
predominantly low-skilled, is the only notable exception.
[Please insert Table 1d about here]
Finally, in Table 1e we show the corresponding data for China and India
the two countries that aspire to move up the chain. Our model suggests
that given the educational achievements such aspirations may be di¢ cult to
achieve.
[Please insert Table 1e about here]
We next develop a model of the optimal choice of education policy when
the budget is ￿xed.
3 The Model
Consider a two-sector small open economy inhabited by a continuum of
agents of unit measure. Sector X produces a high-tech product while sector
Y produces a primary commodity. In both sectors labor is the only input in
production, however, the productivity of each worker depends on his level of
education and his sector of employment. To keep things simple we assume
that there are three levels of education, namely low, medium, and high.
Workers with a low level of education (type l) can only ￿nd employment
in sector Y where they produce 1 unit while workers with a medium level
of education (type m) can produce v(> 2) units in either sector.13 The
high level of education (type h) is useful only to workers employed in the
high-tech sector where each produces V (> v) units.
The distribution of educational attainment in the economy is completely
determined and ￿nanced by the government. Agents are initially identical
but education separates them into three skill groups that correspond to
the three levels of education. We assume that the low level of education is
provided to all agents and that the ￿xed education budget of the government
is su¢ ciently high to cover its cost. The remaining budget is equal to b. We
13Setting the productivity the same in the two sectors keeps the number of parameters
low and, below, it will become clear that it is without any loss of generality.
8assume that the size of the education budget is exogenously determined. We
normalize to unity the cost of providing an agent with the medium level of
education and denote by c the cost of providing an agent with the high level
of education.14 We impose the following restrictions on the parameters of
the model:
Condition 1 V
c > v > 2
Condition 2 b < c
The ￿rst condition implies that investment in the high level of educa-
tion is e¢ cient.15 The second condition implies that the government cannot
provide all agents with the high level of education, however, it does not
necessarily imply that the government is ￿nancially constrained. As long
as both goods are consumed in equilibrium then it is ine¢ cient to provide
agents employed in the Y sector with the high level of education. A suf-
￿cient condition for a ￿nancially constrained government is that b = 1 as
either some agents employed in the X sector will be type m or some agents
employed in the Y sector will be type l.
Let ￿i (i = l;m;h) denote the proportion of type i agents. The govern-
ment￿ s choice of ￿i￿ s must satisfy the following two constraints:
￿l + ￿m + ￿h = 1 (1)
and
b > ￿m + c￿h (2)
where the second constraint states that government spending on education
cannot exceed the budget.
All agents have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences speci￿ed as:
Ui = (XiYi)
1
2 i = l;m;h (3)
where Xi and Yi denote a type i￿ s worker consumption of the high-tech
product and primary commodity, respectively.
14Given that the size of the budget is exogenous what matters is the size of the budget
relative to the cost of education.
15Notive that if v < 2 it is never optimal to employ agents with medium level of
education at the primary sector.
93.1 The Production Possibilities Frontier
The government￿ s choice of education policy determines the economy￿ s pro-
duction possibilities which is shown graphically in Figure 1. The reason
that the frontier is vertical at the point where it intersects the horizontal
axis is that type l workers can only produce the primary commodity. The
maximum amount of X that can be produced is attained when all type m
and type h workers are employed in that sector. Given the education distri-
bution in order to produce more than ￿l units of Y (remember that a type l
worker can produce 1 unit of Y ), e¢ ciency requires that the ￿rst workers to
change employment are type m workers and, thus the middle section of the
frontier has a slope equal to 1. As the production of Y is further increased
the slope takes the value v
V because type h workers can each produce either










Figure 3: Production Possibilities Frontier
104 Autarky
We derive the equilibrium under autarky in two stages. Under the assump-
tion that all markets are competitive, we begin by deriving the equilibrium
price and the corresponding production and consumption allocations for
an arbitrary education policy. Then, we derive the education policy that
maximizes aggregate welfare. The following preliminary result signi￿cantly
simpli￿es the equilibrium analysis.
Proposition 1 If the government is ￿nancially constrained, e¢ ciency re-
quires that type l and type m workers are employed in the Y sector and type
h workers are employed in the X sector.
Proof. Suppose not. Then one of the following must be true:
a) Aggregate production of the X sector is less than V ￿h. But this
implies that some type h workers are employed in the Y sector. Further,
a binding government constraint means that ￿l > 0. Then the government
could have enhanced welfare by reducing ￿h and increasing ￿m as this change
in policy would result in a higher output of the primary commodity with-
out any reduction in the production of the high-tech product. We have a
contradiction.
b) Aggregate production of the X sector is more than V ￿h. But this
implies that some type m workers are employed in the X sector. Consider
a small increase in the proportion of type h workers. Then the budget con-
straint implies that the proportion of type m workers has to be reduced with
d￿m
d￿h = ￿c. Now suppose that after this change you keep the production in
sector X constant. Given that all type h workers are employed in sector
X then the proportion of type m workers employed in this sector will be
reduced and d￿m
d￿h = ￿V
v . But since V
v > c the reduction in the proportion
of type m workers in sector X is higher than the reduction in the over-
all proportion of type m workers in the economy and therefore after the
above change the government can increase production in sector Y without
decreasing production in sector X. We have a contradiction.
The above result implies that given the government￿ s education policy
production in sector X will be equal to V ￿h while production in sector Y
will be equal to ￿l + v￿m.
Using the primary commodity Y as the numeraire let pA denote the
autarky price. Further let IA
i denote the income of a type i worker. Maxi-









where proposition 1 implies that IA
l = 1, IA
m = v, and IA
h = pAV . Equilib-
rium under autarky requires that the following market clearing conditions






pA (￿l + v￿m) + V ￿h
￿
and




￿l + v￿m + pAV ￿h
￿
where in both conditions the left-hand side equals the supply of that good
and the right-hand side equals the corresponding demand. Solving either of






It also follows from proposition 1 that 1 > pA > v=V .
4.1 Optimal education policy






















￿l + v￿m + V ￿hpA￿
(6)
subject to (5),
￿h = 1 ￿ ￿l ￿ ￿m (7)
and
￿m =
c(1 ￿ ￿l) ￿ b
c ￿ 1
(8)
where the last two constraints follow from (1) and (2).
The optimal proportion of type l workers under autarky is:
￿A
l =
1 ￿ b ￿ c + bc ￿ bv + 2cv ￿ bcv
2(1 ￿ c + cv)
(9)
12By substituting the above solution in (7) and (8) we ￿nd the optimal solu-
tions for ￿h and ￿m, respectively, and then by substituting these solutions
in (5) we can solve for the optimal price under autarky:
pA￿ =
1 + c(v ￿ 1)
V
(10)
Notice that the autarky price does not depend on the size of the budget.
This is because we have focused our attention to the case of an interior
solution for the education policy; i.e. when ￿l > 0;￿m > 0 and ￿h > 0. In
this case, because preferences are homothetic, the size of the budget does
not a⁄ect the ratio of the production levels of the two goods and hence
the equilibrium price. For intermediate values of budget size, as the latter
changes the proportions of the three types of agents adjusts so that the
above ratio stays constant.
By substituting (9) in (8) and di⁄erentiating with respect to b we ￿nd
that ￿m is increasing as the budget increases. When the budget is su¢ ciently
low we have ￿A
















1 + c(v ￿ 1)
V
= pA￿
where notice that v does not appear in the above solution because there
are not any type m workers. Also notice that the relative price decreases
as the budget increases. This is because the budget restrains output in the
high-tech sector X. As the budget size increases the proportion of type h
workers increases while the proportion of type l workers decreases. Equating
pA1 with pA￿ we ￿nd a threshold level for the budget, given by
b1 =
c
2 + c(v ￿ 1)
such that when b < b1, ￿A
m = 0.
There is another threshold level for the budget, b2, such that when the
budget is higher that this threshold ￿A
l = 0. In that case (5) implies that
the corresponding autarky price is given by:
pA2 =
v(c ￿ b)
V (b ￿ 1)
< pA￿
13Equating pA2 with pA￿ we ￿nd that
b2 =
1 + c(v ￿ 1) + cv
1 + c(v ￿ 1) + v
Figure 2 shows the autarky price as a function of the budget. Notice
that if b > 1
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Figure 4: Autaky Price Function
5 Trade
Suppose that the small economy trades with the rest of the world at the
world price p￿ and that the government does not adjust its education policy.
14Then it is clear that if pA > p￿ the economy will export the primary com-
modity and if pA < p￿ it will export the high-tech product. However, the
government can further enhance welfare by adjusting its education policy
after the change in the trade regime.
By substituting the world price for the autarky price in (6) we obtain






2(￿l + v￿m + V ￿hp￿)
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Notice that the above expression is independent of ￿l which implies that we
obtain corner solutions. The intuition is that under free trade it is optimal
for the economy to specialize as long it is allowed by the budget constraint.
When the budget is su¢ ciently high so that the corresponding constraint
is not binding we also allow the government to redistribute any budgetary
surplus.
The optimal education policy under trade depends on the sign of the
expression in (11) that is in brackets. The expression is equal to 0 when the
world price p￿ is equal to pA￿. The following proposition de￿nes the optimal
production patterns under trade.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Production Patterns) (a) If p￿ > pA￿ it is optimal
that the economy produces as much as possible of the high-tech product,
X (the budget will not allow complete specialization). (b) If p￿ < pA￿ it
is optimal that the economy specializes in the production of the primary
commodity, Y .
Proof. (a) In this case (11) is greater than 0 which implies that ￿l must
be set as high as possible. This is because, given the budget constraint, the
only way that the economy can increase the production of X is by increasing
￿h that can only be accomplished by increasing ￿l while decreasing ￿m. At
the optimum we have ￿l = c￿b
b ;￿m = 0; and ￿h = b
c. (b) In this case (11)
15is less than 0 and optimality requires to set ￿l as low as possible so that ￿m
is at the maximum possible level. If b 6 1, ￿m = b and if b > 1;￿m = 1
(budget surplus).
Notice that the above optimal production decisions do not depend on the
price under autarky. This is in contrast to traditional trade models where
the optimal production decisions and hence the patterns of trade depend on
the di⁄erence between the autarky price and the world price. The reason
is that in traditional models the production possibilities frontier is ￿xed.
In the present model, when the government changes the education mix it
also changes the production possibilities frontier. We will see shortly that
this is crucial for understanding patterns of trade reversals. The following
proposition de￿nes the patterns of trade before and after the change in
education policy for all possible autarky prices. Let X￿ or Y ￿denote the
good that was exported before the change in education policy and X+ or
Y + denote the good that is exported after the change.
Proposition 3 Optimal trade patterns before and after the change in edu-
cation policy are as follows:
Case 1: b < b1
1a: If p￿ > pA then X￿ and X+
1b: If pA > p￿ > pA￿ then Y ￿ and Y +
1c: If pA > pA￿ > p￿ then Y ￿ and Y +
Case 2: b1 < b < b2
2a: If p￿ > pA = pA￿ then X￿ and X+
2b: pA = pA￿ > p￿ = then Y ￿ and Y +
Case 3: b2 < b
3a: If p￿ > pA￿ > pA then X￿ and X+
3b: If pA￿ > p￿ > pA then X￿ and Y +
3c: If pA￿ > pA > p￿ then Y ￿ and Y +
Proof. Consider the patterns of trade before the change in education
policy. Then it is clear that when p￿ > pA was optimal for the economy
to export the high-tech product X while when p￿ < pA was optimal to
export the primary commodity Y . Next, consider the patterns of trade after
the change in education policy. With only exception case 1b, they depend
on the patterns of specialization derived in proposition 2. In case 1b the
education policy is determined by proposition 1 and welfare is maximized
when the economy specializes in the high-tech product X. However, the
binding budget constraint does not allow the government to further increase
16production in that sector and thus it keeps exporting the primary commodity
Y .
The proposition identi￿es four type of economies. Sub-cases (1a), (2a)
and (3a) identify economies for which it is always optimal to export the
high-tech product while sub-cases (1c), (2b) and (3c) identify economies for
which it is always optimal to export the primary commodity. In contrast,
sub-cases (1b) and (3b) identify economies for which a change in the patterns
of trade is optimal.
Moving up the chain: Notice that case 1b is the only instance where it
would be optimal for the government to adjust its education policy in order
to reverse the patterns of trade so that the economy ￿ moves up the chain￿ .
What prevents the government from pursuing such a policy is the binding
budget constraint. We show below that if the government is able to borrow
from abroad it would be bene￿cial to do so. The following proposition
demonstrates that the welfare gains resulting from a change in the patterns
of trade will be higher than the welfare loss incurred from a lump-sum tax
imposed to ￿nance the loan.
Proposition 4 Suppose that pA > p￿ > pA￿. Then it is optimal to ￿nance
increased educational expenditures and move up the chain of comparative
advantage.
Proof. We know that in this case it is optimal for the economy to






c. De￿ne welfare without borrowing as Wn and welfare
with increased educational expenditures ￿nanced by foreign borrowing as














The new welfare level after an increase in the budget by ￿b that is ￿nanced







c ￿ b ￿ ￿b
c
(1 ￿ ￿b) +
b + ￿b
c
(V p￿ ￿ ￿b)
￿
where the increase in the budget allows for a greater proportion of agents
receiving the high level of education. Subtracting the former expression from
17the latter we get























2 [V p￿ ￿ 1 ￿ c]







1 + c(v ￿ 1)
V
￿ 1 ￿ c
￿
which is positive given that v > 2.
Moving down the chain: Proposition 3 identi￿es one instance, that
is case 3b, where a reversal in the patterns of trade is optimal and feasible
without any outside intervention. The government can increase welfare by
encouraging producers to specialize in the production of the primary com-
modity. This is because the world price of the high tech good is relatively
low and thus welfare is higher when the economy specializes in the pro-
duction of the primary commodity. In contrast, when the economy exports
the high-tech product the gains from trade are low because of the relatively
small di⁄erential between the autarky price and the world price.
5.1 Numerical Example
Let WA, WX, and WY denote aggregate welfare under autarky, aggregate
welfare under trade when the economy maximizes the production of the
high-skill product X, and aggregate welfare under trade when the economy
maximizes the production of the low-skill primary commodity Y . In ad-
dition, ￿
j
i denote the proportion of type i(= l;m;h) agents given that the
economy maximizes production in sector j(= X;Y ). We set the following
parameter values: c = 2, v = 2:2, V = 5. These values imply that b1 = :455,
b2 = 1:393, pA￿ = :68 and that pA 2 (:44;1). Notice that if the budget is
not binding then the autarky price will be equal to :4. The various cases in
table 2 below correspond to the cases analyzed in proposition 3. An asterisk
denotes optimal choice.
[Please insert Table 2 about here]
6 Conclusion
In the beginning of this paper we asked the following question. Is it ever
optimal for a government of a small developing economy that moves from
18autarky to trade, and with an initial skill distribution that was optimal
under autarky, to change its education policy so that its patterns of trade
are reversed? The above analysis suggests that not only is it sometimes
optimal to increase educational spending in order to move up the chain, i.e.,
change from an economy that exports low-skill goods to one that exports
high-skill goods, but sometimes it is optimal to move down the chain and
switch from exporting high tech goods to exporting low tech goods.
Moving up the chain might require outside help so our results have also
some interesting policy implications for the provision of aid. Any economy
with a binding budget constraint can bene￿t from aid in the form of loans
or grants to increase educational spending. However, the size of the bene￿ts
can di⁄er signi￿cantly. For those countries in which it is optimal to move up
the chain, relaxing the budget constraint would allow them to switch their
patterns of trade and in that case the welfare gains would be very high. In
fact, they will be su¢ cient to cover the cost of ￿nancing the loan.
In future work we would like to endogenize the government budget and
determine the optimal government policy in the context of a dynamic model.
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20Table 1a: High-tech Exports
Country Year Sec. Ed. Tert. Ed. Broad Narrow
France 1980 43.0 8.5 56.8 23.7
1990 48.3 11.4 59.4 28.3
2000 55.7 18.4 65.7 35.1
Italy 1980 33.3 4.1 48.8 16.7
1990 40.5 9.0 49.3 18.7
2000 46.7 14.7 51.6 20.4
Japan 1980 54.3 14.4 72.9 47.1
1990 65.7 21.2 84.0 49.6
2000 71.9 24.0 85.1 49.4
Mexico 1980 17.2 5.4 54.3 35.7
1990 32.6 9.2 67.7 38.1
2000 40.3 11.3 73.8 53.5
UK 1980 44.7 11.8 65.5 23.2
1990 52.4 13.9 67.9 27.0
2000 58.2 19.1 73.1 33.5
US 1980 92.7 29.8 72.5 30.0
1990 89.6 45.2 73.9 34.4
2000 89.7 50.1 76.9 40.0
21Table 1b: Low-tech Exports
Country Year Sec. Ed. Tert. Ed. Broad Narrow
Argentina 1980 26.5 6.1 28.2 3.4
1990 37.3 12.0 24.8 3.6
2000 44.6 19.7 34.0 13.4
Chile 1980 34.1 7.2 5.8 1.1
1990 46.2 12.3 7.2 1.2
2000 51.8 15.8 12.2 3.1
Colombia 1980 21.3 4.3 19.5 4.6
1990 26.0 6.9 28.7 1.7
2000 31.3 9.9 41.1 5.1
Ecuador 1980 23.6 7.6 34.7 2.6
1990 30.4 17.4 32.8 1.0
2000 37.0 18.7 22.2 3.5
Guatemala 1980 9.6 2.2 20.4 1.3
1990 11.1 4.4 14.5 1.0
2000 15.3 5.8 31.6 2.6
South Africa 1980 28.5 1.4 24.4 4.7
1990 26.9 3.8 27.7 9.0
2000 57.9 10.4 37.1 14.2
22Table 1c: Moving Up the Chain
Country Year Sec. Ed. Tert. Ed. Broad Narrow
Hong Kong 1980 37.6 7.1 37.6 17.1
1990 53.9 10.6 40.8 19.2
2000 62.7 15.3 49.0 25.1
Korea 1980 45.8 8.9 29.8 21.5
1990 67.3 13.4 48.6 32.8
2000 75.3 25.8 71.8 43.3
Malaysia 1980 21.3 1.4 29.8 23.6
1990 29.9 2.8 56.6 44.1
2000 50.5 7.5 75.6 43.5
Singapore 1980 18.0 3.4 71.5 24.8
1990 36.0 4.7 80.7 28.4
2000 59.1 10.6 89.4 37.1
Taiwan 1980 32.6 9.3 36.0 21.1
1990 49.9 12.2 48.7 23.3
2000 60.2 19.1 55.8 26.6
Thailand 1980 9.7 2.9 11.4 7.3
1990 15.8 7.8 30.5 15.3
2000 20.6 11.3 55.8 26.6
23Table 1d: Moving Down the Chain
Country Year Sec. Ed. Tert. Ed. Broad Narrow
Bulgaria 1980 28.8 6.7
1990 40.0 8.9 33.0 6.8
2000 54.6 16.6 40.5 6.1
Hungary 1980 30.6 7.0 4.1 0.5
1990 39.1 10.1 4.2 0.2
2000 46.7 12.0 18.4 2.7
Poland 1980 39.6 5.7 61.5 22.7
1990 55.7 7.9 43.7 14.8
2000 60.6 11.1 40.5 26.0
Romania 1980 44.2 5.2
1990 70.1 6.9 55.9 15.9
2000 72.9 8.9 28.1 12.1
24Table 1e: China and India
Country Year Sec. Ed. Tert. Ed. Broad Narrow
China 1980 22.7 1.0
1990 36.4 2.0 33.1 15.7
2000 38.4 2.7 41.2 21.0
India 1980 16.2 2.5 16.4 6.5
1990 18.2 4.1 21.2 4.7
2000 22.2 4.8 20.6 5.4
25Table 2: Optimal Education Policies and Patterns of Trade
1 b = :4 pA = :8 ￿A
l = :8, ￿A
m = 0, ￿A
h = :2 WA = 0:89
1a* b = :4 p￿ = 1 ￿X
l = :8, ￿X
m = 0, ￿X
h = :2 WX = 0:9
1a b = :4 p￿ = 1 ￿Y
l = :6, ￿Y
m = :4, ￿Y
h = 0 WY = 0:74
1b* b = :4 p￿ = :7 ￿X
l = :8, ￿X
m = 0, ￿X
h = :2 WX = 0:90
1b b = :4 p￿ = :7 ￿Y
l = :6, ￿Y
m = :4, ￿Y
h = 0 WY = 0:88
1c b = :4 p￿ = :5 ￿X
l = :8, ￿X
m = 0, ￿X
h = :2 WX = 0:92
1c* b = :4 p￿ = :5 ￿Y
l = :6, ￿Y
m = :4, ￿Y
h = 0 WY = 1:05
2 b = 1 pA = :68 ￿A
l = :32, ￿A
m = :36, ￿A
h = :32 WA = 1:33
2a* b = 1 p￿ = :8 ￿X
l = :5, ￿X
m = 0, ￿X
h = :5 WX = 1:40
2a b = 1 p￿ = :8 ￿Y
l = 0, ￿Y
m = 1, ￿Y
h = 0 WY = 1:23
2b b = 1 p￿ = :4 ￿X
l = :5, ￿X
m = 0, ￿X
h = :5 WX = 1:18
2b* b = 1 p￿ = :4 ￿Y
l = 0, ￿Y
m = 1, ￿Y
h = 0 WY = 1:74
3 b = 1:45 pA = :54 ￿A
l = 0, ￿A
m = :55, ￿A
h = :45 WA = 1:66
3a* b = 1:45 p￿ = 1 ￿X
l = :275, ￿X
m = 0, ￿X
h = :725 WX = 1:95
3a b = 1:45 p￿ = 1 ￿Y
l = 0, ￿Y
m = :55, ￿Y
h = :45 WY = 1:73
3b b = 1:45 p￿ = :60 ￿X
l = :275, ￿X
m = 0, ￿X
h = :725 WX = 1:58
3b* b = 1:45 p￿ = :60 ￿Y
l = 0, ￿Y
m = 1, ￿Y
h = 0 WY = 1:71
3c b = 1:45 p￿ = :45 ￿X
l = :275, ￿X
m = 0, ￿X
h = :725 WX = 1:42
3c* b = 1:45 p￿ = :45 ￿Y
l = 0, ￿Y
m = 1, ￿Y
h = 0 WY = 1:97
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